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I. Introduction
Cellular phones are a technological tidal wave. Today there are
over 195 million cellular phone subscribers in the United States,'
double the number of subscribers just five years ago.2 Cell phones
are increasingly ubiquitous in our society, altering how we
communicate and how we interact as a society.'
. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2007;
B.A., University of California, San Diego. I am indebted to Professor Rory Little, Kevin
Bankston and Lee Tien for their insights. All errors and omissions are mine alone.
1. CTIA - The Wireless Association's Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey
(2005), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIAMidYear2005Survey.pdf.
2. Id.
3. See generally, PERPETUAL CONTACT: MOBILE COMMUNICATION, PRIVATE
TALK, PUBLIC PERFORMANCE (James E. Katz & Mark A. Aakhus eds., 2002).
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of cell phones is that
they make us all readily available, no matter where we are. Cell
phones come with us everywhere we go: streets, homes, offices, and
even those intimate public spaces where a phone ring means
embarrassment, such as theaters, high-end restaurants, and even
churches. 4
But while cell phones follow us everywhere we go, they also
allow us to be followed everywhere we go. Cell phones constantly
relay their location to the cellular towers that serve their network,
providing the cellular service provider with an often quite accurate
picture of the location of the phone
Such accurate location tracking seems to be a boon for public
safety, enabling location tracking of 911 calls made from cellular
phones. 6  Marketers also stand to benefit through location-based
services and advertising.' Businesses are using this technology to
track the whereabouts of mobile employees,8 and states are
contemplating using this technology to track traffic patterns. 9 One
may even track a loved one or "buddy" using this technology.10
The ability to track others has not gone unnoticed by law
enforcement. Within the last two years, fifteen published decisions
have issued from federal district courts regarding law enforcement
applications for cell phone location tracking information. In eleven
of these decisions, the court found that probable cause must be shown
to obtain cell phone location tracking information and because less
than probable cause was shown by law enforcement the requests were
4. RICH LING, THE MOBILE CONNECTION: THE CELL PHONE'S IMPACT ON
SOCIETY 125 (2004).
5. See infra Part II A.
6. Darren Handler, An Island of Chaos Surrounded by a Sea of Confusion: The
E911 Wireless Device Location Initiative, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1 10 (2005) (stating that
the majority of 911 calls will soon be made by cellular phone). Congress has mandated that
all cellular service providers be able to provide detailed location information to rescuers,
pursuant to the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
81,113 Stat. 1286 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
7. See generally, David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational
Surveillance in Wireless Communication, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y. 1, 11 (2003).
8. Ben Charny, Big Boss is Watching, CNET, Sep. 24, 2004,
http://news.com.com/big+boss+is+watching/2100-1036-3-5379953.html.
9. David A. Lieb, Motorists' Cell Phones Are Tracked to Monitor Traffic Patterns;
Missouri Near Deal for Statewide System, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at A06.
10. Moon Ihlwan, Working Late Won't Work Anymore; New Services Can Track You
- Or Your Loved Ones - By Cell Phone, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 31, 2005, at 40. See also
loopt, a start-up that uses GPS and other location technology to enable "social mapping"
of others' locations via cellular phone. This technology is currently used by Boost Mobile,
a Sprint Nextel Corp. subsidiary claiming over 3.1 million subscribers.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [29:3
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CELL PHONE TRACKING
denied.' In the other four decisions, surveillance authorization was
granted; 2 however, the information sought was arguably more limited
11. In re Application of the U.S. for an order (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Register
and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Location and/or
Cell Site Information, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter E.D.N.Y.
Decision]; In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [hereinafter S.D. Tex. I
Decision]; In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use
of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification System on Telephone Numbers [sealed] and
[sealed] and the Production of Real Time Cell Site Information, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D.
Md. 2005) [hereinafter D. Md. I Decision]; In re Application of the U.S. for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C.
Jan. 11, 2006) [hereinafter D.D.C. Decision]; In re the Application of the U.S. for an
Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information, 412 F. Supp. 2d
947 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter E.D. Wis. Decision]; In re the Application of the
U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and/or Trap and
Trace for Mobile Identification Number (585) 111-1111 and the Disclosure of Subscriber
and Activity Information Under 18 U.S.C. 2703, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)
[hereinafter W.D.N.Y Decision]; In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device
and Cell Site Location Authority on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663
(S.D.W. Va. 2006) [hereinafter S.D.W. Va Decision]; In re Application of the United
States for Orders Authorizing the Installation and Use of Pen Registers and Caller
Identification Devices on Tel. Nos. [Sealed] and [Sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md.
2006) [hereinafter D. Md. II Decision]; In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1)
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2)
Authorizing the Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the
Disclosure of Location-Based Servs.; In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1)
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2)
Authorizing the Release of Subscriber and Other Information; and (3) Location of Cell
Site Origination and/or Termination, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45643, 2006 WL 1876847
(N.D. Ind. Jul. 5, 2006) [hereinafter N.D. Ind. Decision]; In re Application for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and use of a Pen Register and Directing the Disclosure of
Telecomms. Records for Cellular Phone assigned the No. [Sealed], 439 F. Supp. 2d 456,
457 (D. Md. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer
Records, and (3) Cell Phone Tracking, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Tex. 2006) [hereinafter
S.D. Tex Decision]; In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective
Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11747, 2006 WL
468300 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006).
12. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications
Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d
435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter S.D.N.Y. I Decision]; In re Application of the U.S. for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site
Information, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. La. Jan. 26,2006) [hereinafter W.D. La. Decision];
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and
Other Info., 433 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Tex. 2006) [hereinafter S.D. Tex. II Decision]; In re
Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location
Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
[hereinafter S.D.N.Y. III Decision].
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than in most other district court decisions. As more courts face
applications for orders granting access to cell phone location tracking,
there is little doubt that more published decisions are on the way. In
fact, many unpublished orders have already been granted."
In light of ever-increasing mobile technology," there is a strong
need for Fourth Amendment guidance in this area. As many
commentators have noted, dispersed privacy interests of the populace
often receive limited attention from legislators compared with the
organized interests of law enforcement." Conflicting district court
opinions seem headed for appeal, 16 and appellate court decisions can
often help spur legislative action. 7 It would not be premature for the
Supreme Court to address such a widespread issue. 8
The modern Fourth Amendment test to determine whether an
unreasonable search has taken place comes from Justice Harlan's
concurrence in Katz v. United States: whether the individual being
searched harbored actual expectations of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. 9 While this test is broadly
applicable, it has been criticized as being "circular" 20 and "self-
indulgent.",2' The Katz test has also had the effect of focusing Fourth
Amendment scrutiny on the conduct of the individual, and not on the
13. See S.D. Tex. I Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 749 n.2 (noting that in that division,
313 pen register applications were processed in 2004).
14. In addition to the proliferation of cell phones, wireless internet and related
technologies continue to grow. See Lee Rainie, Pew Internet & American Life Project,
Technology & Media Use Report, Apr. 13,2004,
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/pip-apr2004,-data-memo.pdf. (17% of Internet users
have logged on using a wireless device).
15. Peter P. Swire, Correspondence: Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz., 102 MICH. L.
REV. 904, 914 (2004).
16. To date, the government has not pursued appeal of any denials of requests for
authorization, although the government did renew an application rejected by Magistrate
Judge Peck before District Judge Kaplan. S.D.N.Y. II Decision, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454
(2006).
17. Swire, supra note 15 at 917. The 1967 Berger and Katz decisions are widely seen
as having prompted a Congressional overhaul of surveillance law. Privacy legislation is
often addressed in a passive, wait-and-see manner. See James P. Nehf, Incomparability and
the Passive Virtues of Ad Hoc Privacy Policy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2005).
18. But see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the Court defer to the legislature in defining broad protections for the
future).
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
21. "[The reasonable expectations of the Katz test] bear an uncanny resemblance to
those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable." Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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22
government. Although the famous mantra of Katz that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places, 23 property-based precepts
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence continue to guide the Supreme
Court.24
Yet despite this widespread criticism, 25  the "reasonable
expectation" test remains the modern test of whether a search is
reasonable. But as cell phone location tracking illustrates, new
technologies have the ability to squeeze our reasonable expectations
wafer-thin. Indeed, under the reasonable expectation test, if most
Americans were aware that their location could be tracked via their
cell phone, all cell phone users would likely forfeit any expectation of
privacy in their movements, in return for the technological
convenience of the cell phone. Yet it is hard to imagine such a
holding sitting well with cell phone users.26
Part II of this note will describe how cell phone location tracking
technology works, discuss the relevant statutes that regulate such
surveillance, and analyze applicable Supreme Court precedent. Part
III of this note will show that, depending on a number of factors, cell
phone location tracking may or may not qualify as a reasonable
search under Katz and its progeny. Part IV of this note argues that
because cell phone location tracking implicates a number of core
Fourth Amendment doctrines, it should constitute an unreasonable
search.
22. See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1314-15 (2002).
23. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
24. See Simmons, supra note 22 at 1309; Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and
New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801,
815 (2004).
25. Noted criminal defense attorney Milton Hirsch suggests jettisoning the Katz test.
Milton Hirsch, Should the Katz Test for Fourth Amendment Interest be Abandoned?,
Fourth Amendment Forum, CHAMPION MAGAZINE, November 2003, at 36. Professor
Peter Swire claims that Katz is dead. Swire, supra note 15. For a large set of of other
critics, including such leading lights as Wayne LaFave, Yale Kamisar, Scott Sundby and
others, see George C. Thomas, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison
Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1500
(2005).
26. Witness the brouhaha over recent revelations that President Bush has authorized
warrantless surveillance of American citizens. See, e.g., Edward Epstein, Bush to Face





A. How the Technology Works.
Cell phones constantly relay their locations to cellular towers, in
order that the next inbound call should be received without a hitch.27
This process, called "registration," occurs roughly every seven
seconds when the cell phone is turned on; the user of the phone does
not need to take any action, and is probably unaware that the phone
is sending these signals. The only way to stop these signals is to turn
the phone off. These location signals are sent on one band-the
other two frequency bands that the phone uses are for sending and
receiving voice and data.
A mobile telephone switching office (MTSO) manages the
cellular system. When a call is received, the MTSO gets the call and
then locates the user based on the nearest tower that the user's phone
registered with.' The call is then sent to the phone by the nearest
tower. A similar process works in reverse when the user places a call.
As a user's location moves, the strength of the signal within the
cell served by that tower may diminish. Meanwhile, as the user gets
closer to a second tower, that tower will recognize the increasing
strength in signal. The towers measure the strength of signal-and
thus the relative location of the cell phone-through Time Difference
of Arrival (TDOA) or Angle of Arrival (AOA) methods. TDOA
calculates the amount of time it takes a signal to travel from the
phone to the tower in order to calculate the approximate location of
the phone. AOA calculates the approximate location of the phone by
measuring the angle at which the tower receives the phone's signal.
Based on these measurements, the MTSO will then send a signal to
the cell phone's control channel that it is time to switch to the
frequency of the nearer tower, and the phone will continue the call
uninterrupted despite changing towers.'
A very general sense of a phone's is can be gathered by tracking
the location of the tower being used during a call. In urban areas,
where there are many towers, this may give a picture location within a
couple hundred feet. In rural areas, towers may be miles apart. A
27. Phil Karn, Cell Phone Tracking, COLLUSION, Vol. 32, Feb. 2002,
http://www.collusion.org/article.cfm?id=373. See also S.D. Tex. I Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d
747, 750-51; Recent Development: Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy Concerns
Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307,
308 (2004).
28. See Julia Layton, Marshall Brain and Jeff Tyson, How Cell Phones Work,
Howstuffworks, http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone4.htm.
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slightly more accurate location picture can be generated by tracking
which 120 degree "face" of the tower is receiving a cell phone's
signal.29
A more accurate picture of a phone's location may be generated
by using triangulation, which uses TDOA or AOA to measure the
relative signal strength of the three nearest cellular towers. The
FCC's Enhanced 911 (E-911) mandate requires the ability to track
95% of calls within 300 meters using triangulation. This method of
tracking is popular with cellular service providers, because it uses the
existing infrastructure. And various technologies are being widely
implemented that use enhanced methods of triangulation to provide a
more accurate picture of the phone's location.3
The use of a GPS chip in the handset of new phones has emerged
as an alternative for many cellular service providers. Over 90% of
cell phones currently in use have built-in GPS location-tracking
capabilities3' that incorporate longitude and latitude using the
already-existing GPS satellite infrastructure, and allow for extremely
accurate tracking-potentially within 50 feet.32  The FCC's E-911
mandate requires that 95% of 911 calls from cellular phones using
GPS can be tracked within 150 meters. GPS suffers in urban areas
and when the phone is indoors, because a direct line to the satellite is
broken. Assisted GPS (A-GPS) technology, which provides reference
points for the system, mitigates this problem and shows promise for
the future.33
29. See S.D.N.Y. I Decision, 405 F. Supp.2d 435, 437 (2005). It does not appear that
such "face" information is tracked by all cellular service providers.
30. See TruePosition, Inc., An Examination of U-TDOA and Other Wireless Location
Technologies, available at http://www.trueposition.com/irc/index.php (registration
required) (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (comparing the company's Uplink Time Difference of
Arrival (U-TDOA) technology to A-GPS, Enhanced Cell ID, and other technologies). See
also Polaris Wireless, http://www.polariswireless.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (offering a
Wireless Location Signature (WLS) technology). The MIT Media Lab's Reality Mining
project is using Bluetooth ID technology to successfully track user location via Bluetooth-
enabled cell phones. See http://reality.media.mit.edu.
31. F.C.C. Enhanced 911 Carrier Quarterly Reports, Nov. 2005,
http://www.fcc.gov/911/enhanced/reports/phase2-waiver.html.
32. Note that, despite having widespread GPS-enabled handsets, many service
providers will continue to provide 911 location tracking using network-based
triangulation. Handler, supra note 6 at 21.
33. See Jimmy Lamance, Javier DeSalas, and Jani Jarvinen, Assisted GPS: A Low-
Infrastructure Approach, GPS WORLD, Mar. 1, 2002, available at
http://www.gpsworld.com/gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=12287.
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B. The Current State of Statutory Protection.
This sort of electronic surveillance is generally governed by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).4  The
ECPA was itself a major overhaul of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. 3' These statutes have been frequently
amended in an effort to keep up with changes in modern technology
and shifting security concerns, and the result is ambiguous,
overlapping guidance in the area of cell phone location tracking.
3 6
In order to obtain location tracking information, law
enforcement must seek a court order requiring the cellular service
provider to turn over this data.37  It appears that these orders are
routinely requested by law enforcement, and are probably routinely
granted.38
However, there is considerable debate regarding the legal
standard required for obtaining these orders, depending on what
aspect of the ECPA one believes is implicated. As we shall see,
location tracking information may be analogized to a pen register (a
device whereby law enforcement can track the numbers called by a
particular phone) or a trap-and-trace device (a device which allows
tracking of the numbers of inbound phone calls). This sort of data is
not protected by the Fourth Amendment, and can be obtained on a
relatively minimal showing of "certified relevance. The pen
register standard may apply to the signaling and routing information
used by cell phones, in addition to phone numbers;' however, cell
34. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, found at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.
35. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197.
36. As Magistrate Judge Gorenstein grumbled: "[Analyzing the relevant statutes] has
hardly been a satisfying exercise inasmuch as we are left with the conclusion that Congress
has given a direction that cell site information may be obtained through some unexplained
combination of the Pen Register Statute with some other unspecified mechanism."
S.D.N.Y. I Decision, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 442. Indeed, on relatively similar facts, different
district court decisions have come out differently, illustrating the murkiness of the relevant
statutes in this area.
37. This is based on the requirements of the ECPA (see note 34, supra). However, it
appears that law enforcement has the capability to obtain cell phone location data without
the help of the service provider. See S.D. Tex. I Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 755
(discussing a device that can snatch cell phone signals out of the air called a "trigger-fish").
38. Jonathan Krim, FBI Dealt Setback on Cellular Surveillance, WASHINGTON POST,
Oct. 28, 2005, at A5.
39. The same standard applies to both pen registers and trap-and-trace devices under
the Pen Register Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2007).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2007). Under the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA), which amended the ECPA, cell phone tower location
information falls under the definition of call identifying information, and has been held to
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phone location information may not be obtained pursuant "solely" to
a pen register order.41
"Solely" implies that some other authority, when combined with
a pen register order, will permit law enforcement to track cell phone
location information. However, what that other authority may be is a
matter of swirling debate in the federal district courts. Four courts
have held that the other authority Congress had in mind is the Stored
Communications Act (SCA), which requires a showing of "specific
and articulable facts. 4 2 However, the majority of district courts that
have considered the matter have held that the other authority
required is that applicable to tracking devices: the probable cause
normally required for a warrant.43 The distinction between these two
lines of decisions has turned in part on the sort of cell phone tracking
information requested, as will be discussed further.
Present statutes do not require that evidence gathered without a
court order-in violation of the statute-be suppressed.' Of course,
these statutory provisions must satisfy the baselines established by the
Constitution. Unfortunately, Fourth Amendment doctrine in this
area is more confusing than any existing legislation.
C. Fourth Amendment Precedent.
Under current doctrine, whether an unreasonable search has
occurred is a matter of case-by-case, technology-by-technology
analysis.46  Though the Supreme Court attempts to give law
enforcement "bright-line" rules to follow, the realities of modern life
and advancing technologies stretch previous Fourth Amendment
parameters. Though no direct analogue to cell phone location
be the sort of voluntarily conveyed information in which the conveyor has no expectation
of privacy. U.S. Telecom. Assoc. v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2007).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2007).
43. The standard required for tracking device surveillance is codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3117. The probable cause required is spelled out in Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 41.
44. As long as such statutes are constitutional, they do not violate the Fourth
Amendment, and the exclusionary rule does not apply.
45. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 349 (1974). Few would argue that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has gotten
any clearer in the last 30 years.
46. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (involving
thermal imaging, high-powered cameras, and sophisticated eavesdropping equipment,
respectively-each stretching the applicability of existing doctrine).
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tracking has been considered by the Court, two lines of cases raise
similar issues.47
Smith v. Maryland4 8 considered the warrantless use of a pen
register by law enforcement. The Court held that in dialing a phone
number, the individual voluntarily conveys the number to the phone
company, and thereby assumes the risk that this information will be
revealed by the phone company to the police.4 9 As will be discussed
below, this information is similar to cell phone location information,
which is conveyed by the cell phone to the cell phone service
provider.'
United States v. Knotts5" and United States v. Karo52 analyzed the
use of electronic tracking beepers without a warrant. In those cases,
law enforcement officers placed a radio transmitter inside a five-
gallon drum of chloroform, and a five-gallon can of ether,
respectively, before those containers were sold to the defendants,
who used the chemicals for the manufacture of illegal drugs. Where
the tracking beeper was used to follow the movements of the
defendants on public thoroughfares, the Court found no violation of
any reasonable expectation of privacy, for both a car and its
occupants are in plain view on open roads.53 However, in Karo, when
the beeper was used to ascertain the location of the container inside a
house, the Court found the search to be unreasonable, because such
information could not have been visually verified from outside the
house-" As will be discussed below, cell phones share some
47. The applicability of these two lines of cases to cell phone tracking has been noted
in Matthew Werdegar, Lost? The Government Knows Where You Are: Cellular Telephone
Call Location Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REV. 103
(1998) and Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call Location
Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381 (2003). Recent district
court decisions recognize the applicability of these two lines of cases as well.
48. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
49. Id. at 744-45. This "assumption of the risk" holding was built on cases such as
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), which held that an individual has no
expectation of privacy in financial information voluntarily conveyed to a bank. See
generally Patricia L. Bellia, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law: A Symposium to
Discuss Internet Surveillance, Privacy & The USA Patriot Act: Surveillance, Records &
Computers: Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375
(2004).
50. See infra Part III B.
51. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
52. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
53. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (1983).
54. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (1984). Indeed, even that which may be ascertained from
outside the house may be considered an unreasonable search, if the method of the search
reveals too much about the interior of the house. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
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similarities with tracking beepers, but are also distinct in a number of
ways.
A cell phone is not exactly like a pen register or a tracking
beeper. The applicability of either line of cases depends on a number
of factors. One factor is the precise type of location data sought:
whether the data is historical or "real-time" data; whether the data is
gathered only when the phone's user initiates a call, or at any time the
phone communicates with cellular towers; and the level of specificity
of the location data being gathered. A second factor depends on
where the suspect is when his cell phone is tracked. A third factor is
determining the proper focus of analysis: focusing on the location of
the phone itself, or on the user of the phone.
I. Applying the Fourth Amendment to Cell Phone Location
Tracking.
A. Historical Data Versus "Real-time" Data.
Cell phone location data is routinely tracked by cell phone
service providers, both so that wherever a user is he will quickly
receive an incoming call, and because each call must be logged for
billing purposes. Law enforcement may obtain this data
concurrently-that is, as it happens in real time." When law
enforcement requests real-time data, it must ask the court for a
prospective order because such real-time data is inherently not yet in
existence at the time of the request. Alternately, in some
circumstances, law enforcement may go through the retained records
of the service provider to reconstruct a picture of where a suspect was
at a given time in the past.
The distinction between historical and real-time cell phone
location data matters for a number of reasons. However, in one
respect, the distinction is largely meaningless. Historical data may be
recorded, compiled, and transmitted to law enforcement so quickly as
to effectively operate as real-time data.16  Where historical data
operates as real-time data, courts should treat the data as such.
55. But see D.D.C. Decision, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (2006) (noting the concern that
if a warrant is required to obtain real-time data, Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 41 and the Fourth
Amendment require "probable cause to believe that the information sought is itself
evidence of a crime, not that the information is relevant to an investigation." Where
information is sought that hasn't yet happened, it is difficult to argue that it is "itself
evidence of a crime.").
56. Indeed, in a number of district court decisions, the government has argued that
real-time location information falls under Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §
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To the extent truly historical data is utilized by law enforcement,
other issues arise. Truly historical data allows police to reconstruct
the past whereabouts of a suspect; this type of data is distinct from the
real-time tracking utilized in the tracking beeper cases. 7  Truly
historical data may qualify as a business record, and accordingly,
would receive very limited Fourth Amendment protection under the
"assumption of the risk" doctrine. 8 Truly historical data may also be
better able to meet requirements of a warrant,59 and would not run
afoul of the Court's historical concerns with prospective
surveillance.'
In addition to being more limited than real-time tracking by only
providing evidence of that which has already happened, historical
data is limited in another way. It is unlikely that cellular service
providers record the location of each registration-which occurs
many times per minute-of every cell phone every hour of the day.
The amount of data this would generate is immense, and there is little
practical incentive for service providers to keep this data. However,
if location-based marketing takes off, there may be a strong financial
incentive for service providers to keep this information. Additionally,
the cost of data storage continues to shrink over time. While
impractical today, reconstructing a person's whereabouts via
historical cell phone records may not long be the province of science
fiction.
Real-time data is a more penetrating form of surveillance, which
is clearly more desirable to law enforcement, and of greater concern
to privacy advocates than historical data.6 The Supreme Court has
2703(c)-(d). See E.D.N.Y. Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 312-14 (discussing, and rejecting,
the "instantaneous storage" theory advanced by the government). While all data is
historical in some sense, when effectively used in real-time it is disingenuous to treat it as a
historical record.
57. Reconstructing someone's whereabouts through phone records is not analogous
to following them on a public street, which was the basis for the holding of Knotts. See
Werdegar, supra note 47 at 109.
58. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. The Stored Communications Act, which deals with
historical communication records, reflects the weakened protection afforded business
records by allowing for a court order to issue based on a showing of "specific and
articulable facts showing... [that the information sought is] relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
59. See D.D.C. Decision, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 135.
60. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (construing a two-month
eavesdropping authorization as permitting a "series of intrusions, searches, and seizures
pursuant to a single showing of probable cause.").
61. See, e.g., Jonathan Krim, supra note 38, at A5. Although using cell phone location
tracking technology to preemptively fight crime is some ways off, real-time tracking
clearly can be applied today to solve ongoing crimes such as kidnapping and to track
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considered real-time tracking only in the context of the tracking
beeper cases. There, the Court had no problem with real-time
tracking, as long as it took place in public places, and the Court
equated beeper tracking to an agent physically following a suspect.62
In this respect, real-time tracking with a cell phone is little different
from real-time tracking with a beeper, or in person.
But the analogy to an agent following a suspect does lose some of
its force when applied to cell phone location tracking. If cell phones
are considered tantamount to tracking beepers, then 200 million
Americans are carrying tracking beepers. 63  The scope of such a
proposition gives one pause. The practical impediments to having
agents following 200 million Americans 24 hours per day suggests that
the analogy to physically following suspects in person is inapposite.'
Moreover, if two-thirds of all Americans were aware that they had
police tracking beepers in their cars, or were regularly followed by
police, one might expect both a titanic shift in privacy expectations,
and an outcry from the public. And yet, if the analogy between
tracking beepers and cell phones is carried to its logical conclusion,
we are all carrying tracking devices and, at least while we are in
public, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. This goes well
beyond any sort of "sense-enhancement" as condoned in Knotts, to
borderline omniscience. 65
fleeing criminals. See, e.g., Recent Development, supra note 27, at 310; S.D.N.Y. III
Decision, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 451-52.
62. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
63. Indeed, we all may be deemed to have consented to carrying a tracking beeper
with us, knowingly or unknowingly. See S.D.N.Y. I Decision, 405 F. Supp.2d at 449 ("[T]he
Government does not seek to install the 'tracking device': the individual has chosen to
carry a device and to permit transmission of its information to a third party, the carrier").
Under the "reasonable expectations" test, this "voluntary consent" may actually receive
less judicial concern than a tracking beeper, which is installed without the knowledge nor
the consent of the suspect.
64. Presumably, given the investment of personnel in physically following a suspect,
some fairly high degree of suspicion must be involved. And though tracking beepers make
following a person much easier, such beepers (at least the ones considered in Knotts and
Karo) require the transmitter to be relatively near to the receiver. Additionally, the
installation process requires some sort of focused suspicion to make the tracking worthwhile.
65. Similar fears of widespread surveillance without judicial oversight were raised in
Knotts, and were curtly dismissed, for "the fact is that the 'reality hardly suggests abuse.... '
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283 (citation omitted). However, without judicial oversight, it becomes
rather difficult to ascertain whether the reality of such surveillance suggests abuse.
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B. Passive Versus Call-based Location Tracking.
Cell phones constantly communicate with the towers around
them. 66 This occurs passively on one channel as long as the phone is
powered on, with no action taken by the phone's user. The only way
to stop this passive communication is to turn the phone off.
Call-based location tracking occurs on a separate channel only
when the phone's user initiates or receives a call. The caller is clearly
conveying his location to the phone company in order to complete his
call, and thus it appears that call-based location tracking falls within
the ambit of Smith v. Maryland.67
Three distinctions may be raised here. First, a home phone is
generally used by the people who live in the home-often more than
one person. Cell phones are virtually always used by only one
person-the owner.68 Thus law enforcement is given a more particular
set of data than under the facts of Smith.
A second distinction is that using a pen register or trap-and-trace
device, law enforcement only receives the phone number dialed or
received, with little additional information. Generally a pen register
is sought because law enforcement is interested in knowing whom a
suspect is calling. Any location information that may come with a
pen register (such as knowing that the suspect is at his home when he
makes a call) is purely incidental. Cell phone location information,
on the other hand, is not incidental-instead, the suspect's location is
precisely the information sought.
Nonetheless, the Smith court did not seem particularly concerned
with the type of data sought, as long as it was not "content., 69 Rather,
the holding rested on the "assumption of the risk" premise: the data
had been conveyed to a third party; thus, there was no longer any
expectation of privacy in it. Applying assumption of the risk, it
appears at first blush that a cell phone caller can have no expectation
of privacy in his location when he initiates or receives a phone call.'0
66. See supra Part II A.
67. Under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), cell
phone tower location information falls under the definition of call identifying information.
See supra note 40.
68. See Dawn Nafus & Karina Tracey, Mobile Phone Consumption and Concepts of
Personhood, in PERPETUAL CONTACT: MOBILE COMMUNICATION, PRIVATE TALK,
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 3, at 212.
69. For a discussion of how slippery the concept of "content" as opposed to call
identifying information really is, see David McPhie, Almost Private: Pen Registers, Packet
Sniffers, and Privacy at the Margin, 2005 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1.
70. In distinguishing the information requested in its decision from prior district court
decisions, the S.D.N.Y. I Decision noted that law enforcement had only requested data
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Third, the assumption of the risk applied in Smith was premised
on an assumption by the court that the phone's user was aware that
he must convey phone numbers to the telephone company to
complete calls, and that records may be kept of those calls.71 Cell
phone users may, on the whole, be unaware that their phones
continually broadcast their location, despite any action on the part of
the user.72 This provides some differentiation from Smith; however it
is very likely that in the near future the majority of the populace will
be aware that their phones passively convey location signals.
73
Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently assumed a high degree of
awareness-and thus a lack of privacy expectations-by the public of
such technologies as helicopter fly-overs74  and high-powered
cameras.75 This assumption finds further force in the fact that cell
phones are in widespread general public use.
Passive location tracking requires no great leaps in logic to fall
within the holding of Smith. There is no real positive action by the
phone's owner; however, his phone is conveying his location to a third
party all the same and, if he is aware of the underlying technology, he
is thereby assuming the risk. He has the option of turning his phone
off completely.
76
One court has hinted that passive location tracking is particularly
insidious. In United States v. Forest," a DEA agent called the
defendant's phone a number of times without letting it ring, in order
generated by calls placed by the suspect-not continuous, passive tracking. The court
suggested that this made some difference in its analysis. It is unclear why law enforcement
requested only this data, but one reason may be to bring the data requested more clearly
within the holding of Smith v. Maryland.
71. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,742 (1979).
72. See W.D. La. decision, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 682 (presuming that because cell phone
users have likely experienced dropped calls, they are aware that their cell phone
communicates with the nearest tower, and that because cell phone users have likely
experienced roaming, "users know that third party service providers are aware of their
general location vis-A-vis the nearest tower, at the beginning of, during and at the end of
each call.").
73. See infra note 94 (suggesting that a substantial segment of the populace is already
aware of the location-based functionality of cell phones). Particularly as more location-
based functions become available on cell phones, the assumption will become increasingly
tenable that the majority of the population is aware that cell phones communicate their
position back to the service provider.
74. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
75. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
76. Though discussing only call-based location tracking, the court in the W.D. La.
Decision suggested that the phone's user always had the option to turn the power off on
the phone. 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (2006).
77. 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
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to track his location. In dicta, the Sixth Circuit indicated that the
agent caused the defendant's phone to send out signals, and that the
defendant did not voluntarily convey any signals himself, suggesting
that such a search might fall outside the rationale of Smith."
However, it is technologically possible to track a suspect without
actually calling his phone, as his phone is constantly sending out
signals. Turning off the phone is the only way to stop conveying one's
location to the phone service provider, though from a practical
standpoint the option to turn the phone off hardly seems like an
option, as it strips the phone of its ability to receive calls.
C. The Level of Specificity of Location Data Gathered.
Varying technologies provide different levels of specificity in
location information. Traditional Cell ID tracking can position an
individual only within 250 meters at best.79 U-TDOA, an enhanced
form of traditional triangulation, can provide a location within 50
meters.' A-GPS may get as close as 30 meters, although it suffers
indoors and in urban areas. Undoubtedly, as technology develops,
location tracking will become more precise.
In earlier district court decisions, law enforcement requested
real-time cell site information and was uniformly denied. In more
recent cases,8' law enforcement has requested only the location of the
nearest tower to the suspect. 82 Magistrate Judge Gorenstein of the
Southern District of New York held that this brought the case
squarely under the precedent of Smith, and that the beeper tracking
cases were inapposite. 83 Magistrate Judge Hornsby of the Western
78. Id. at 951. In Smith, the suspect initiated all calls that were tracked.
79. See An Examination of U-TDOA and Other Wireless Location Technologies, note
30, supra.
80. Id.
81. "Many of the initial applications for cell site information sought information that
could be used for triangulation. After these applications were rejected by many courts,
however, the government began to request information regarding only one tower at a
time, apparently in the hope that applications for less detailed and invasive information
would meet with a warmer judicial reception." S.D.N.Y. III Decision, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448,
452 (2006).
82. Knowing the location of one tower is clearly less useful than knowing the relative
positions of three towers; however, seeking authorization for only one tower perhaps
makes a more colorable statutory argument that the cell phone is not being used as a
tracking device; rather, only signaling information is sought, arguably bringing the
information desired within the Pen Register Statute (18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)).
83. S.D.N.Y. I Decision, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449-50 (2005). The court viewed this as
the voluntary provision of data to a third party, governed by Smith, and did not view this
sort of data as location-tracking data. The later S.D.N.Y. III Decision was more
equivocal, recognizing the applicability of both the beeper tracking and pen register cases,
District of Louisiana similarly held that because the data sought was
relatively imprecise, the analogy to tracking beepers failed, as "the
user's movements will not be tracked in the strict or literal sense of
the word." 84
Learning only the location of the nearest tower provides a more
general picture of the suspect's location.. Nonetheless, it gives an
approximate idea of where the suspect is. In urban areas, where
towers can be within a few hundred feet of each other, knowing the
location of the nearest tower may be more precise than basic
triangulation.
Magistrate Judge Hornsby reasoned that because the location of
the nearest tower cannot reveal with pinpoint precision whether or
not, as in Karo, someone is in a home, the Fourth Amendment was
not implicated. But it is unclear why there should be a constitutional
distinction based on tracking precision. Tracking someone is tracking
someone, and there is no logical reason the principles applied should
change based on whether a general or more specific picture of the
suspect's whereabouts is available.
Indeed, tracking someone's location less specifically increases the
chances that one is being tracked while in a private area, such as the
home. Though law enforcement may not know that the suspect is in
his home, they may nonetheless be unwittingly tracking his location
while he is in his house-raising significant Fourth Amendment
concerns. And such tracking clearly discloses a suspect's general
vicinity, revealing what state and town a person is in, and, in denser
areas, even more particular data.
D. Tracking the Suspect at Home.
In theory, under Katz, the Fourth Amendment protects people
and not places. 8 However, in the beeper tracking cases, the Court's
emphasis was not on protecting the person, unless the person was in
his home.' The Court's most recent technology-based surveillance
case, Kyllo v. United States, re-emphasized the sanctity of the privacy
of the home.'
but refusing to reach the constitutional issue in the abstract. 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 462
(2006).
84. W.D. La. Decision, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (2006).
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
86. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984).
87. 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes-the
prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy-there is a
ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy
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This presents a major problem in the context of cell phone
location tracking. Cell phones are constantly in and out of private
places-most commonly homes-where no law enforcement agent
could intrude without a warrant.8 It would be extremely difficult to
track a suspect via cell phone only while he was outside the home, but
never while he was inside the home. This implication of the home
suggests the need for a warrant to engage in cell phone tracking.
However, unforeseen advancements in technology may make
such particular, outside-only tracking feasible. Further, there is little
need to track a person when he is in his home if law enforcement is
simultaneously maintaining visual surveillance. Such surveillance will
generally reveal whether a person is home or not, and if one knows
that a person is in his home, what is the need to track his
whereabouts? Simply turn off the tracking mechanism when the
suspect enters his house, and turn it on again when he leaves. This
would limit the economic efficiency of cell phone tracking by
requiring some in-person visual surveillance, thus limiting the
potential for indiscriminate searches by requiring some particularized
suspicion on the part of law enforcement.
E. Focus on the Phone Versus the Suspect.
In the beeper tracking cases, the Court appeared to focus not on
the beeper itself, but on the suspect. The Court was unconcerned
with any invasion of the defendant's property, and rather viewed the
beeper as simply another way to follow a person around.' This
method-focusing on the person, and not the thing being tracked-
may translate to cell phones as well, which are generally tied to one
person.
However, in the beeper tracking cases, the Court also noted that
visual surveillance would readily reveal when a 5-gallon drum was
brought into or out of a house or car. The same cannot be said of cell
phones: they are small enough that, unless they are in use, visual
that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To withdraw protection of this
minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.") (emphasis in original).
88. Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a
firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may
not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.").
89. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) ("A police car following
Petschen at a distance throughout his journey could have observed him leaving the public
highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respondent, with the drum of chloroform still
in the car.").
90. See Nafus & Tracey, supra note 68.
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CELL PHONE TRACKING
surveillance often cannot reveal where the phone is. Focusing
scrutiny on the phone, and not the user of the phone, would mean
that law enforcement would often be affecting a virtual pat-down,
determining the whereabouts of a phone that cannot be seen with the
naked eye. As a person's "effect," the phone should be entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection itself,91 and a virtual search of the
phone would likely be held unreasonable." As Justice Stevens,
concurring in Karo, recognized, "[cloncealment of personal property
from public view gives rise to Fourth Amendment protection."93
IV. Cell Phone Location Tracking is an Unreasonable Search.
The question of whether cell phone location tracking constitutes
a reasonable search is at best unclear. Indeed, different district courts
have come out differently on very similar facts. However, on closer
scrutiny it seems likely that cell phone location tracking constitutes an
unreasonable search. Three fundamental aspects of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence suggest that cell phone location tracking is
unreasonable.
A. Assumption of the Risk is Limited.
As discussed above, the difference between tracking the location
of a cell phone when a call is made, versus tracking a cell phone
passively at any time is not a constitutionally-based distinction.
Though call-based tracking may appear to mirror the analysis of
Smith, it is a surface similarity. Unlike Smith, the information being
sought is the suspect's location, and not the phone number or
"routing" information involved. In this way, call-based tracking and
passive location tracking both reveal the same sort of information.
To apply Smith to both passive and call-based location tracking,
one must assume that most people realize their location may be
tracked and have thus assumed the risk of being tracked. Many
Americans may be unaware today that their location can be tracked
with their cell phones, and thus have not assumed the risk of having
their locations tracked. However, as location-based services grow,
91. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.").
92. Absent suspicion of a weapon, such a frisk could not be sustained under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
93. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 733 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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public awareness of those services will grow, along with some
recognition of the underlying technology. 94
But even a surge in awareness of the location-tracking
capabilities of cell phones does not mean that we will all be deemed
to have assumed the risk of being tracked because the assumption of
the risk doctrine is qualitative in nature. Not everything that is
disclosed to others is deemed to have been risked. This was
recognized in the very holding of Smith: though both the content of
the call and the number dialed were both transmitted to the phone
company, only the number dialed was deemed "risked" by the caller.
Any search of the content of the call would have fallen within the
purview of Katz, and would clearly have been an unreasonable
search.95
The limits of the assumption of the risk doctrine are unclear.
Where one broadcasts something to the world, one may rightly be
said to have assumed the risk that others will discover it. However, if
anything that has been divulged to a third party may be deemed
"risked," then we would all be lacking the most basic privacy.
Modernly, most important data about individuals is held by third
parties.9' One voluntarily conveys intimate financial, medical, and
even psychological data to our banks, doctors, and counselors. While
some of this data may be obtained without a court order, ' much of it
may only be obtained with judicial oversight." What risks one
assumes appear to depend in large part on the intuition of the
justices. Certain things, though they may be known by third parties,
94. In a 2003 survey of "early adopters", nearly 50% of wireless phone users were
aware of location-based services, which implies the ability to have one's location tracked.
InStat-MDR, Location-Based Services Article, Jan. 31, 2003. Such awareness will only
grow.
95. Indeed, Justice Stewart-the author of the majority opinion in Katz-argued in
his dissent in Smith that the content versus phone number distinction is a chimera. Most
people do maintain an expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial as well as the
content of their calls-and numbers themselves "are not without 'content,"' conveying to
the snooper significant snippets of information. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 747-48
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
96. See James B. Rule, From Mass Society to Perpetual Contact: Models of
Communication Technologies in Social Context, in PERPETUAL CONTACT: MOBILE
COMMUNICATION, PRIVATE TALK, PUBLIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 3, at 246.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (recognizing no Fourth
Amendment privacy interest in the substance of financial information conveyed by a
customer to a bank).
98. See, e.g., Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2) (2006) (imposing security standards and safeguards
for personal medical information); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-
6827 (2006) (imposing limits on access to personal financial information).
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are so private in nature that they are more akin to the content of a
phone call than the mere routing information of the call.
The Court wrestled with the nuances of what sort of risks we
assume in the modern world in Kyllo v. United States.99 In Kyllo, law
enforcement used a thermal imaging device to track the heat
emanating from the defendant's home. Heat tracking disclosed that
certain portions of the defendant's home were far hotter than the rest
of the home, indicating that the defendant was likely growing
marijuana indoors. On the basis of this imaging scan, a warrant was
obtained and the home was searched, resulting in the defendant's
arrest. 0'
The dissent argued that the defendant had assumed the risk that
any passerby might discern a greater amount of heat emanating from
certain parts of the home. It was incumbent upon the defendant to
"make sure that the surrounding area is well insulated" if he wanted
to conceal what was going on indoors.''
The majority, however, recognized that allowing technology to
search the home in ways previously unimagined threatened to "leave
the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology. '"'1° To suggest
that, in order to maintain privacy in the face of advancements in
technology, one must now add extra insulation to one's home struck
the majority as flatly unreasonable.
Similarly, in the case of cell phones, the only option for evading
tracking is to turn off the cell phone, or at minimum to not make or
receive any calls. But turning off the phone strips the phone of the
ability to receive inbound calls, and protecting oneself by not using
the phone simply fails to recognize the reality of cell phone usage in
modern life. "It is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where,
as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative. ' 03
The logical extremes of assumption of the risk were rejected in
Kyllo, and this limitation on assumption of the risk should also be
recognized in the case of cell phone location tracking.
B. Property Precepts Remain Prominent.
As discussed above, tracking a suspect less specifically by
utilizing only the location of the nearest tower instead of triangulation
99. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
100. Id. at 30.
101. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 35.
103. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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or GPS tracking is not a constitutional distinction. Indeed, less-
specific tracking may implicate greater Fourth Amendment concerns,
as the suspect may more easily-if unintentionally-be tracked in a
private location such as the home. More specific tracking may well be
desirable, so that expectations of privacy in the home are not
trampled.
That expectation of privacy in the home has long been
recognized by the Court, ' and has been affirmed in Kyllo 5 and
recently in Georgia v. Randolph. 6Randolph dealt with the issue of
whether one tenant may consent to a search of the home despite the
clear denial of consent to a search by a fellow cotenant. The Court
held that the consenting tenant could not override the cotenant's
denial of consent,"° grounding its ruling in "the 'centuries-old
principle of respect for the privacy of the home.""'
The Court has been firm that technology may not shrink the
privacy afforded by the home. If thermal surveillance of a home is
unreasonable, tracking an individual when he is in his home should
likewise be found unreasonable. And if the home-and presumably
other places, such as hotel rooms"° and phone booths, " ° which have
been analogized to the home-are off-limits, it is difficult to envision
a form of cell phone location tracking that would survive a
constitutional challenge.
C. Reasonable Expectations Have Subtly Shifted.
It would initially appear that as the majority of Americans
become aware that their location may be tracked through their cell
phones, they will be deemed to no longer have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their location. To expect to be untracked
when one knows one may be tracked is simply an unreasonable
expectation.
104. "The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long
history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1960) (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765), and
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
105. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
106. 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1528 (2006).
107. Id. at 1519.
108. Id. at 1523 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999)).
109. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
110. Katz v. United States, 533 U.S. 347 (1967). See also Thomas, supra note 25, at
1501.
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Traditionally, the test taken from Katz queries whether the
subject of the search had a reasonable expectation of privacy. This
method of analysis can be problematic, for any expectation of privacy
may be shrunken if, for example, the government broadcast that "we
were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic
surveillance.' The reasonable expectations test focuses on the
expectations of the individual, which is problematic because "the
regulation of police behavior"-protecting of the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures-"is what the Fourth
Amendment is all about."'"2
The recent cases of Kyllo and Randolph illustrate that the
Court's application of "reasonable expectations" may be shifting. In
both cases, the Court recited a form of the "reasonable expectations"
test. In Kyllo, the Court cited the traditional reasonable expectations
test from Katz, and applied it to the home. In Randolph, the Court
queried "the great significance given to widely shared social
expectations" of privacy in making a determination of the
reasonableness of the search."3
But in neither case did the Court isolate its focus on the actions
of the individual; rather, the Court focused on the conduct of the
police officers. In Kyllo, the Court held that when police use "a
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search.' 114 In Randolph, the Court
held that a disputed consent to search the home "gives a police officer
no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would
have in the absence of any consent at all."" 5 The Court did not
overlook the individual in either case: in both cases the individual was
in his home, and thus was deemed to have a reasonable expectation
of privacy. But the Court did not stop with analyses of the
individuals' expectations, and scrutinized the reasonableness of law
enforcement as well.
This shift in the Court's analysis suggests that society's
expectations of what constitutes a reasonable search may play a part
in determining the reasonableness of a search. A test focused solely
on the individual's expectations allows advances in technology to
111. Amsterdam, supra note 45, at 384. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741
n.5 (1979).
112. Amsterdam, supra note 45 at 369.
113. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1521.
114. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
115. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1523.
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squeeze expectations, leading to a "downward spiral in Fourth
Amendment protection.""' 6 But a test based on societal expectations
of what government can and cannot reasonably do may very well lead
to greater protection of privacy.
It is difficult to assess societal expectations. Some citizens would
undoubtedly be willing to allow warrantless cell phone location
tracking in order to combat crime and terrorism. Others would find
such tracking Orwellian and anathema to a free society. Where a
solid societal expectation of privacy exists - as in the home-it seems
clear that a cell phone location search is unreasonable. However, it
remains to be seen how the Court will address shifting societal
expectations as location-tracking technologies become more
common.
V. Conclusion
Fitting the unique attributes of cell phone location tracking into
existing Fourth Amendment precedent is something like fitting a
round peg in a square hole. Location information-whether tracked
passively or only when calls are made-is qualitatively different from
the routing information at issue in Smith. And as cell phones are
voluntarily carried by the majority of Americans, cell phone tracking
is much different as a practical matter from the tracking devices at
issue in Knotts and Karo.
Nonetheless, these two lines of cases counsel that cell phone
location tracking is an unreasonable search. First, as reflected in
Karo and repeatedly confirmed by the Supreme Court, any
warrantless surveillance of an individual in his home is unreasonable.
Cell phone location tracking-at least with presently-existing
technology-cannot help but implicate the home. Second,
assumption of the risk is a nuanced doctrine. Individuals should not
be required to take unreasonable protective measures to keep private
that which they reasonably expect to keep private. Assertions that
individuals wishing to avoid location tracking should turn off their
phone or leave it at home are unreasonable in light of modern cell
phone usage patterns.
Finally, the beginnings of a shift in the core application of the
reasonable expectations test also suggest that cell phone location
tracking is an unreasonable search. Recent Supreme Court decisions
have focused not only on the suspect's reasonable expectations of
116. Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance of Justice
Scalia's Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 1013, 1024 (2001).
[29:3
2007] FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CELL PHONE TRACKING 445
privacy, but on the reasonableness of the actions of law enforcement.
This shift in analysis potentially offers Fourth Amendment protection
to cell phone users in a world where cellular location-based services
are becoming increasingly widespread.
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